

The effects of increased traffic enforcement on other crime

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Abstract

American communities are currently confronted with several public safety challenges: homeland security, violent crime, illegal drugs, property crimes, and calls for service. This is also apparently true for many other countries around the world. Law enforcement resources are being stretched thin in every community in attempts to deal with these issues. Traffic law enforcement has been given a lower priority despite the fact that traffic crashes result in more deaths, injuries, and societal costs in most communities than any of the other problems. Specific traffic law enforcement strategies have been shown to be effective in reducing impaired driving. In 2003, the Fresno, California, Police Department increased impaired driving enforcement from 1 or 2 operations per year between 1998 and 2002, to 32 in 2003 and almost 130 in 2010. Not only were alcohol-related crashes reduced by 17%, but burglary rates and motor vehicle theft rates per capita declined by 17% and 32%, respectively, between 2003 and 2011. This is compared to another city in California (Simi Valley) that did not change their traffic enforcement over that same period (2003-2011), conducting 3 impaired driving operations in each year. Burglary rates per capita increased 5% while motor vehicle theft rates per capita decreased only 3% during that period. When examining robberies, the rates in Fresno decreased 29% between the periods from 1996-2002 (pre-intervention) and 2003-2011(post-intervention). In contrast, the Simi Valley rates for robberies increased 35% between those same periods. Employing high-visibility traffic enforcement, such as the use of sobriety checkpoints and saturation patrols, is known to raise the perceived probability of apprehension for impaired driving, but may also raise the perceived risk of being arrested for other criminal activity. If it can be demonstrated that increased traffic enforcement reduces other crime in the community, police departments in the United States and other countries may be more willing to use resources to implement that strategy. Countries that already use high visibility traffic enforcement in terms of random breath testing (RBT) and automated enforcement (speed and red light cameras) should analyse other crime rates associated with those activities.

Introduction

Most communities in the United States are confronted with several public safety challenges ranging from homeland security, violent crime, illegal drugs, property crimes, and unintended injuries to calls for service for a variety of reasons. Law enforcement resources have not increased to keep up with the added responsibilities and are being stretched thin in every community in attempts to deal with each of these problems. Traffic law enforcement is given a low priority in many U.S. communities despite the fact that traffic crashes result in more deaths, injuries, and societal costs in most communities than any of the other problems (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012; National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2011; Subramanian, 2012). Specific impaired-driving traffic-enforcement strategies, such as frequent and highly publicized sobriety checkpoints, have been shown to be extremely effective in reducing alcohol-related crashes on the order of 10-20% (Elder et al., 2002; Fell, Tippetts, & Levy, 2008; Lacey, Jones, & Smith, 1999; Peek-Asa, 1999; Shults et al., 2001). In addition, sobriety checkpoints not only result in arrests for driving-while-intoxicated (DWI), but many times yield arrests for stolen vehicles, illegal firearms, outstanding warrants, and drug violations (Fell, et al., 2008; Lacey, et al., 1999).

Two early studies (Sampson & Cohen, 1988; Wilson & Borland, 1978) demonstrated that U.S. communities that experienced higher levels of traffic enforcement also experienced lower rates of robbery. In the Kansas City, Missouri, Gun Experiment, traffic officers were assigned to an area

with a high rate of violent crime. The officers were given specialized training on how to search vehicles for illegal guns during traffic stops. Gun seizures increased by 65% in the targeted area with no increase in the comparison area. The targeted area experienced a 50% reduction in gun crimes with no reduction in the comparison area. Weiss and Freels (1996), however, found no evidence in the Dayton, Ohio, Traffic Enforcement Experiment that increased traffic enforcement reduced the incidence of robbery or auto theft, nor did it affect the arrests for index offenses. An article discussing traffic enforcement and other crime (Weiss & McGarrell, 1999) succinctly summarized the issue up to that time. The authors concluded that traffic law enforcement can be an effective way to increase police visibility and, subsequently, increase the perceived risk of apprehension for any crime—citing classic deterrence theory.

There is an abundance of anecdotal information to substantiate that when traffic law enforcement increases in a community, other crime (e.g., burglaries and robberies) decreases. For example, in 1993, a Baltimore County, Maryland, Selective Traffic Enforcement Program (STEP) produced 275 driving-under-the-influence (DUI) arrests compared to 61 in 1992. There were 9,523 other traffic arrests and an additional 249 criminal arrests. This cooperative effort contributed to a 12% reduction in robberies and a 63% reduction in burglaries in the surrounding areas as compared to the previous year (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 1997).

In 1994, the police chief in Grand Prairie, Texas, kept track of how his officers made arrests. He found out that traffic enforcement was responsible for 37% of all arrests that year. It was also determined by the Grand Prairie chief that 47% of the arrests made by traffic enforcement officers were for serious and criminal offenses: drug violations, weapons violations, theft and larceny, assault, robbery, burglary, and even kidnapping (one case) and murder (one case; Morford, Sheehan Jr., & Stuster, 1996). In 1991, the Peoria, Illinois Police Department reduced traffic enforcement activity and instituted a community oriented policing style. Unfortunately, in that first year of the change, calls for service increased 12% and self-initiated activity by officers decreased by 25%. After a mild public outcry, citizen surveys indicated that speeding and traffic violations were big concerns. Emphasis was switched the next year in Peoria on self-initiated activity such that those activities increased 14%, citations went up 16% and crime decreased by 6% (Harris, 1999).

In terms of productivity, there is some evidence that traffic stops using on-view and consent searches annually lead to more drug seizures and arrests for drug violations than do undercover enforcement strategies (Sweeny, 1999). For example, a vehicle stopped for careless driving on Interstate 70 by the Mississippi Highway Patrol resulted in a seizure of \$53,000 in cash and 288 pounds of cocaine with a street value of \$16 million. Further investigation eventually led to the arrest of seven more offenders involved in shipping the cocaine to New York City, New York (Brownlee, 1994).

There is also evidence of an apparent relationship between risky behavior in traffic and criminal behavior (Junger, West, & Timman, 2001). Exposure to traffic crash risk of drivers who displayed risky traffic behavior revealed that those drivers (n=1531) had an odds ratio of 2.6 for having a police record for violent crime; 2.5 for vandalism; 1.5 for property crime; and 5.3 for having been involved in some traffic crime. Giacomassi and Forde (2000) studied the relationship between the homicide rate and motor vehicle fatality rate in 81 cities in the United States. In finding a moderate relationship, the authors concluded that lack of visible traffic enforcement may signal that police are absent or uncaring, which may lead to higher rates of crime in the community as reflected by homicide rates.

With regard to impaired driving and public safety, each year for the past decade, an estimated 1,400,000 drivers have been arrested for DUI in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012), yet only about 1 in 200 drivers with illegal blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) on U.S. roads is arrested for DUI (Beitel, Sharp, & Glauz, 2000; Hause, Voas, & Chavez, 1982). A

nationally representative telephone survey of more than 10,000 licensed drivers showed that U.S. drivers admitted to 85.5 million drinking-and-driving trips in the past 30 days in 2008 (Moulton, Peterson, Haddix, & Drew, 2010). A national roadside survey conducted in 2007 revealed that 12% of nighttime weekend drivers on U.S. roads had been drinking and 2% were legally intoxicated (BAC > .08 g/dL [grams per deciliter]; Lacey et al., 2009). Although the United States made progress in reducing impaired-driving consequences between 1982 and 1997, little progress has been achieved since that time (Dang, 2008; Fell, Tippetts, & Voas, 2009). The proportion of all drivers in fatal crashes estimated to have been legally intoxicated (BAC \geq .08 g/dL) decreased from 35% in 1982 to 20% in 1997, and has levelled off at 20% to 22% each year thereafter (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Proportion of all drivers involved in fatal crashes estimated to have been legally intoxicated (BAC \geq .08 g/dL), 1982-2010 (-37%)
(Source: NHTSA, 2012)

Impaired driving currently results in at least 10,000 to 11,000 traffic crash deaths, 200,000 to 300,000 injuries, and \$130 billion in societal costs to the United States annually, including \$11.7 billion in medical care costs and 475,000 quality-adjusted life years lost (Zaloshnja & Miller, 2009). Effective enforcement of impaired driving is therefore very important to public safety.

Law enforcement agencies around the world use different enforcement strategies at varying intensities to target the problem of impaired driving. Because criminal deterrence is based on the perceived risk of apprehension and sanctioning, traffic safety laws must be enforced and publicized to be effective (e.g., Ross, 1984; Ross & Voas, 1989). Due to budgetary constraints and competing directives, police agencies in the United States are quite limited in the number of impaired drivers they can contact, arrest, and take off the streets (relative to the number of impaired drivers on our roads at any given time). However, by visible enforcement of impaired driving, law enforcement agencies can communicate to the public that impaired drivers will be caught and that those who do drive while intoxicated face certain, swift, and substantial sanctions for their behavior (Lacey, et al., 1999; Ross, 1992a; Ross, 1992b). The perceived probability of apprehension has been found to be the most important factor in deterring criminal behavior (Ross, 1992b). The strategy of using high-visibility traffic enforcement where many drivers experience or see the enforcement activity (such as the use of sobriety checkpoints) raises the perceived probability of apprehension for DUI. It may also raise the perceived risk of being arrested for other criminal activity. However, because of limited resources devoted to DUI in law enforcement agencies in the United States and a hesitance to conduct sobriety checkpoints (Fell, Ferguson, Williams, & Fields, 2003), questions remain about how to develop a traffic enforcement program that places only minimal burden on police (so they

will be more willing to implement traffic enforcement activities regularly) while retaining high levels of effectiveness. If it can be demonstrated that increased traffic enforcement (and specifically sobriety checkpoints) reduces other crime in the community, police departments in the United States may be more willing to implement that strategy and the benefits may go beyond traffic safety. Police agencies in Australia and New Zealand currently devote considerable resources to traffic law enforcement strategies including random breath testing (RBT) and speed cameras. We would hypothesize that other crime rates have been affected by these traffic safety programs. Increased traffic law enforcement may not only improve public safety with regard to impaired driving, but also may reduce other crime in the community and improve homeland security.

According to a recent study by the National Academy of Sciences, frequent and sustained use of sobriety checkpoints could save up to 3,000 lives annually if used in most communities in the United States (Transportation Research Board, 2010).

Therefore, the purpose of this preliminary study was to determine if substantial increases in impaired-driving enforcement in one United States community had an effect on other crime in addition to an effect on impaired-driving crashes relative to a second community that did not increase their DWI enforcement. If our hypotheses are confirmed, a much larger study will be proposed.

Methods

Data Driven Approach

To aid U.S. law enforcement agencies to operate with a higher degree of efficiency, the NHTSA, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Institute of Justice in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies across the country, developed and launched a law enforcement operational model in 2008 that could address the competing demands for increased services. The Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS) program is focused on improving the quality of life issues rather than on singular criminal or traffic safety problems, addressing the larger issues of traffic safety in conjunction with criminal activity. DDACTS is grounded in problem-oriented law enforcement strategies and focuses on traffic law enforcement as an effective tool in reducing crime, crashes, and traffic violations in a community.

DDACTS relies on seven guiding principles for its implementation: data collection, data analysis, community partnerships, strategic operations, information sharing and outreach, program monitoring, and measuring outcomes. Several communities demonstrating the use of DDACTS use so-called “Hot Spot” strategies. This strategy identifies areas in the community where an abundance of the impaired-driving arrests or crashes occur, along with a high incidence of other crime. These overlapping “hot spots” sometimes account for close to 50% of the criminal activity in the community. The effect of “hot spot” policing on crime was analyzed by Barga (2007). The results of his systematic review supports the assertion that focusing police efforts at high crime activity locations can be effective in preventing crime (see also Barga, 2002; Eck, 1997, Eck, 2002; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Beginning in 2005, the Fresno, California, Police Department has been using a DDACTS-type approach in their traffic enforcement activities. In this preliminary analysis, we determine if that strategy also has had an effect on other crime (pre-DDACTS from 2004-2008 vs. post-DDACTS from 2009-2013).

We selected one intervention and one comparison community in a quasi-experimental design to provide preliminary information on this issue. The intervention community was one that started up a weekly sobriety checkpoint program in 2003: Fresno, California. In Fresno, in the mid-1990s, violent crime soared and police resources were focused on suppressing violence. The Fresno Police Department increased the number of police officers but the traffic enforcement squad did not

change. There were approximately 22,000 residents for every traffic officer (only 22 traffic officers at the time). In 2002, the Fresno Chief of Police noted that Fresno lost 52 people in traffic crashes while 43 were killed in violent crimes. State revenue growth and federal funding has allowed Fresno to increase the number of traffic officers from 22 in 2002 to more than 70 in 2011. In addition, impaired-driving enforcement has been substantially increased, mostly in the conduct of weekly sobriety checkpoints. Combined with special DUI patrols, impaired-driving enforcement gradually increased in Fresno from one or two DUI operations per year between 1998 and 2002 to over 100 per year in 2012. Table 1 shows the enforcement operations in both cities.

Table 1. Impaired-driving Enforcement Operations from 2003 – 2012, Fresno, California, and Simi Valley, California

	Number of DUI Operations in Fresno	Number of DUI Operations in Simi Valley
2003	32	3
2004	75	3
2005	94	3
2006	94	3
2007	117	3
2008	117	3
2009	116	3
2010	127	3
2011	94	3
2012	114	3

We selected Simi Valley, California, as the comparison community because they reported no increase in their DUI operations during the same period from 2003 to 2012. Simi Valley is in the same State (California) as Fresno and therefore operates under the same impaired driving laws and policies as Fresno. Fresno is located in central California while Simi Valley is in southern California, and consequently have different media outlets, which could influence perceptions of risk.

Results

Our preliminary analyses indicated that DUI-related injury crashes decreased from 151 in 2002 to 78 in 2012 (down 48%) in Fresno. In addition, other crimes in Fresno have gone down in association with the increased traffic enforcement activity. A preliminary analysis of three crimes shows that burglary rates per capita declined by 17% and motor vehicle theft rates per capita decreased 32% between the periods 1998 to 2002 (preintervention period) and 2004 to 2011 (postintervention period) in Fresno, in association with the increased impaired-driving enforcement. This compares to Simi Valley that did not increase their impaired-driving enforcement between 2002 and 2011. That city experienced a 5% increase in the burglary rate per capita and only a 3% decrease in the motor vehicle theft rate per capita between the pre-intervention period (1998-2002) and the post-intervention period (2004-2011). Examining robberies in a slightly different manner, the annual rates in Fresno decreased 29% between the period from 1996 to 2002 and the period from 2003 to 2011. In contrast, Simi Valley annual rates for robberies increased 35% between the same two time periods. See the Appendix for these and other crime numbers in both cities.

In addition, the Fresno traffic enforcement program has been shown to be associated with a significant decrease in motor vehicle crash admissions to the hospital and in moderate injury

severity of crash victims and a concomitant decrease in hospital charges and length of stay (Davis et al., 2006).

Discussion

The strategy of using high-visibility traffic enforcement, where many drivers experience or see the enforcement activity, such as the use of sobriety checkpoints, is to raise the perceived probability of apprehension for driving while intoxicated (DWI) or DUI according to classic deterrence theory. However, it may also raise the perceived risk of being arrested for other criminal activity. Due to limited resources devoted to DWI in law enforcement agencies, questions remain about how to develop a traffic enforcement program that places only minimal burden on police (so they will be more willing to implement traffic enforcement activities regularly) while retaining high levels of effectiveness. If it can be demonstrated that increased traffic enforcement (especially the use of sobriety checkpoints) reduces other crime in the community, police departments may be more willing to implement that strategy.

A simple preliminary analysis indicates that burglary rates per capita declined by 17% and motor vehicle theft rates per capita decreased 32% between the 5-year period before 2003 and the 8-year period from 2004 to 2011 in Fresno, in association with the increased impaired-driving enforcement. This compares to another city in California (Simi Valley) that did not increase their impaired-driving enforcement between 2003 and 2011. That city experienced a 5% increase in the burglary rate per capita and only a 3% decrease in the motor vehicle theft rate per capita between 2002 and 2011. Examining another crime, robberies, revealed even more dramatic findings: a decrease in the annual rate of 29% in Fresno pre-to-post-intervention compared to a 35% increase in annual robbery rates in Simi Valley in the same time periods. The strategy of using high-visibility traffic enforcement where many drivers experience or see the enforcement activity (such as the use of sobriety checkpoints) apparently not only raises the perceived probability of apprehension for DUI, but may also raise the perceived risk of being arrested for other criminal activity. Because of limited resources devoted to traffic enforcement in many law enforcement agencies, questions remain about how to develop a traffic enforcement program that places only minimal burden on police (so they will be more willing to implement traffic enforcement activities regularly) while retaining high levels of effectiveness. If it can be demonstrated that increased traffic enforcement reduces other crime in the community, police departments in the United States and around the world may be more willing to implement that strategy.

A key strength of this preliminary study is that both cities that were analysed reside in the same State and are exposed to very similar factors that could affect impaired driving and other crime rates. The big difference between the two communities was the intensity of impaired driving enforcement. This preliminary study has obvious limitations, however. We compared only two communities and examined only three crimes. We conducted a simple comparison analysis of the crime rates. A much more comprehensive, multi-community study is being planned to test our hypotheses. Some communities will have intensive impaired driving enforcement, some will have standard enforcement and some will have limited enforcement. We will use time series regression analyses in that larger study to determine associations between impaired driving enforcement intensity and other crime rates. Other factors that could affect crime rates (e.g. economic factors) will be included as covariates in the analyses.

Certainly, more research needs to be conducted to validate the link between increased traffic enforcement and reductions in other crime. This paper provides the first step in that direction. Further comprehensive, controlled studies will be needed to confirm these results. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand that already conduct intensive traffic enforcement are encouraged to study the effects of RBT and automated enforcement (e.g. speed cameras) on other crimes. This will provide more evidence of this potential double effect.

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Appendices

FBI CRIME INDEX 10 YEAR PROFILE

YEAR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PERIOD	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - DEC	JAN - NOV
NOTES	3	4, 5, 6, 7, 8	9, 10, 11, 17	12, 13, 17	14, 15, 17	17	18		19	
INDEX TOTAL	31,304	30,270	29,443	28,832	24,012	24,838	23,963	27,484	28,338	25,931
PERCENT CHANGE	-10%	-3%	-3%	-8%	-11%	3%	-4%	15%	3%	N/A
PERSON CRIMES TOTAL	3,504	3,498	3,897	3,525	3,043	2,782	2,833	3,034	2,916	2,531
PERCENT CHANGE	-7%	0%	11%	-10%	-14%	-8%	6%	3%	-4%	N/A
WILLFUL HOMICIDE	36	53	48	52	52	40	42	45	35	47
FORCIBLE RAPE	154	181	149	133	99	80	85	70	51	48
ROBBERY	1,215	1,232	1,275	1,282	1,104	984	1,085	1,021	1,020	919
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	2,089	2,030	2,425	2,058	1,788	1,678	1,720	1,898	1,809	1,517
PROPERTY CRIMES TOTAL	27,800	26,774	25,784	23,687	21,181	22,280	21,188	24,607	25,666	23,624
PERCENT CHANGE	-10%	-4%	-4%	-8%	-10%	6%	-6%	18%	4%	N/A
BURGLARY	3,926	3,994	4,170	4,355	3,897	4,173	4,423	5,252	5,713	5,409
LARCENY	17,508	17,119	16,088	14,097	13,049	14,105	13,359	14,545	14,928	14,121
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	5,661	5,245	5,288	4,944	4,023	3,777	3,248	4,553	4,780	3,870
ARSON	605	416	248	260	222	224	156	147	134	124
POLICE REPORTS	120,478	120,878	121,181	117,587	110,881	109,748	103,412	84,181	91,054	84,647
CALLS FOR SERVICE	408,388	418,518	430,628	418,850	432,804	433,811	432,320	408,080	404,548	385,108
PERCENT CHANGE	3%	3%	3%	-3%	3%	0%	0%	-5%	-1%	N/A
DEMOGRAPHICS										
SQUARE MILES*	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	113
POPULATION**	448,500	456,203	464,727	464,727	481,035	481,035	486,116	495,913	494,665	505,009
SWORN PERSONNEL***	698	730	778	802	818	849	849	824	767	748
NON-SWORN PERSONNEL***	354	365	372	387	415	476	438	212	200	202

* Fresno PD GIS Data

** California Department of Finance

*** Fresno PD Personnel

NOTES

[2] A preliminary report was released to the PIO in February 2002. This report reflected 421,568 CFS for 2001. Further analysis revealed this information was derived using a Data911 Internal report which included not only unique police events, but also fire events. The correct data as of 3/22/2002 is reflected in the above table.

[3] The number of homicides reported included one more than actually occurred. The difference was due to an unreported death from 2000 that was reclassified in 2003 to a homicide as a result of improved forensic findings. The November 2003 report also reflected three previously reported homicides that were later deemed justifiable, resulting in a negative three count.

[4] The population was adjusted to reflect the figures published by the City of Fresno Development Department, California State Department of Finance.

[5] As of Jan 2004, carrying forward a process that began in 2003, arsons are not reported until an arson investigator investigates the report and deems it an actual arson. FPD has adopted a new program, National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), and not all records have been imported at this time.

[6] The number of homicides reported included one more than actually occurred in 2004. The difference was due to an unreported death from April 2003 that was reclassified in February 2004 to a homicide as a result of improved forensic findings.

[7] FPD reorganized a reporting process. Arson counts for April 2004 are lower than normal. Preliminary indications reflect that May will be significantly higher due to a cumulative adjustment.

[8] e-Reports added to correct system compatibility issues (March).

[9] Arson category represents a cumulative adjustment of 2 months of arson cases given to arson investigators for review.

[10] May - Aug arson counts not complete until reviewed by the FPD arson investigator.

[11] Homicide count includes a prior year death ruled as a homicide this year.

[12] Violent Crime & Property Crime totals include prior year counts.

[13] FPD reorganization: CVB was established on May 1, 2006 under Lieutenant Mark Salazar. CVB is comprised of 14 UCR Clerks and 6 Crime Analysts, that work collectively to provide accurate and timely deliverance of the Return A Report.

[14] FPD reorganization: CVU was established on January 15, 2007 under Sergeant Tom Rowe.

[15] Jan - Jun 2007 e-Reports (arson/e) were all added to July's counts.

[16] FPD district boundaries were revised & implemented on January 1, 2009.

[17] Due to software conversion, arson counts were added to the Index Total inflating the numbers for years 2005 - 2008. Adjustments were made to correct sub-totals.

[18] FPD district boundaries were revised & implemented on January 1, 2011, going from five districts to four.

Fresno, California

**Fresno Police Department
FBI Crime Index
10 Year Profile**

Jan-Dec	1996	1998	1997	1998	1998 (-1)	2000 (-1)	2001	2002 (-2)	2003 (-3)	JAN 2004 (-5)
Index Total	47,687	42,803	38,746	32,916	29,677	33,342	36,170	34,814	31,304	2,630
Percent Change	1.4%	-10.1%	-8.6%	-16.0%	-10.1%	12.7%	6.6%	-1.8%	-8.8%	N/A
Person Crimes Total	6,868	6,483	4,781	4,263	4,008	3,843	4,082	3,780	3,604	288
Percent Change	-8.7%	-3.6%	-12.6%	-11.0%	-6.8%	-4.1%	8.2%	-7.4%	-7.3%	N/A
Willful Homicide	72	69	60	36	26	24	40	42	36	3
Forcible Rape	212	217	192	174	160	160	200	158	164	13
Robbery	2,165	2,088	1,794	1,394	1,268	1,304	1,360	1,479	1,215	124
Aggravated Assault	3,210	3,089	2,735	2,649	2,554	2,355	2,482	2,101	2,089	156
Property Crimes Total	41,828	37,340	33,964	28,882	26,688	29,489	31,088	30,834	27,800	2,284
Percent Change	2.9%	-10.9%	-9.0%	-16.9%	-10.8%	16.4%	6.4%	-0.8%	-8.8%	N/A
Burglary	7,633	6,868	6,640	5,203	4,419	4,515	5,207	4,476	3,926	317
Larceny	20,550	20,180	19,035	16,949	15,763	18,740	18,334	18,476	17,608	1,443
Motor Vehicle Theft	12,418	9,178	7,166	5,671	4,643	5,777	6,996	7,175	5,661	443
Arson	1,327	1,114	1,123	839	744	466	551	707	605	31
Police Reports	112,797	108,113	114,074	112,822	109,866	111,814	117,881	120,047	120,478	8927
Calls For Service	383,680	381,673	386,717	373,710	388,841	388,404	387,842	396,728	408,388	32,002
Percent Change	0.1%	-8.1%	1.1%	2.2%	-1.8%	0.7%	5.0%	2.0%	2.7%	N/A
Demographic										
Sq. Miles *	101	101	101	101	104	104	104	104	104	104
Population *	395,500	400,900	405,900	409,100	413,200	427,700	435,700	442,300	448,500	448,500
Sworn Personnel	502	551	599	653	694	701	701	717	748	748
Non-Sworn Personnel	248	268	273	308	332	361	361	394	391	391

Sq. Miles and Population Demographics Source: City of Fresno Development Department

Personnel Staffing Levels Source: Fresno Police Department - Planning and Research Section

Note (-5) * As of Jan 2004, carrying forward a process that began in 2003, arson are not reported until an Arson Investigator investigates the report and deems it an actual arson. The Fresno Fire Department has adopted a new program, National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), and not all records have been imported at this time.

Note (-4) * The population for the City of Fresno has been adjusted to reflect the figures published by the City of Fresno Development Department, California State Department of Finance.

Note (-3) * The number of Homicides submitted to the FBI include one more than actually occurred in 2003. The difference reflects a Year 2000 death that was reclassified in 2003 to a Homicide as a result of improved forensic findings. The November 2003 report reflects three homicides that were previously reported and subsequently deemed justifiable, resulting in a negative three count.

Note (-2) * Note, a preliminary report was released to PIO in February 2002. This report reflected that there were 421,598 CFS for Year 2001. Further inspection to assess the validity of the data revealed that this information was derived directly using a using a default Deb911 internal report. Analysis by programming staff in Police-IGB revealed that the results in using this program provides information inclusive of not only unique Police Events, but, also Fire Calls and multiple Police event transactions. The result of this initial (pre-audit) condition provided an inaccurate representation of the CFS data. The correct data as of 3/22/2002 is reflected in the above table.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIME STATISTICS FOR SIMI VALLEY

Source: Department of Justice Preliminary Report. Selected California jurisdictions with a population of 100,000 or more.

FBI CRIME INDEX
CALIFORNIA CRIME INDEX

	FBI Crime Index Total*	CA Crime Index Total	Total	Willful Homicide	Forcible Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	Burglary	Motor Vehicle Theft	Larceny Theft	Arson
1991	3442	1468	273	6	13	65	189	1195	742	453	1947	27
1992	3547	1473	267	2	11	76	178	1206	760	446	2034	40
Difference	105	5	-6	-4	-2	11	-11	11	18	-7	87	13
Percent Change	3.1	0.3	-2.2	-66.7	-15.4	16.9	-5.8	0.9	2.4	-1.5	4.5	48.1
1992	3547	1473	267	2	11	76	178	1206	760	446	2034	40
1993	2892	1236	255	0	16	54	185	981	611	370	1632	24
Difference	-655	-237	-12	-2	5	-22	7	-225	-149	-76	-402	-16
Percent Change	-18.5	-16.1	-4.5	-100.0	45.5	-28.9	3.9	-18.7	-19.6	-17.0	-19.8	-40.0
1993	2892	1236	255	0	16	54	185	981	611	370	1632	24
1994	3153	1287	218	1	9	39	169	1069	651	418	1833	33
Difference	261	51	-37	1	-7	-15	-16	88	40	48	201	9
Percent Change	9.0	4.1	-14.5	0.0	-43.8	-27.8	-8.6	9.0	6.5	13.0	12.3	37.5
1994	3153	1287	218	1	9	39	169	1069	651	418	1833	33
1995	2941	1149	196	4	12	57	123	953	626	327	1759	33
Difference	-212	-138	-22	3	3	18	-46	-116	-25	-91	-74	0
Percent Change	-6.7	-10.7	-10.1	300.0	33.3	46.2	-27.2	-10.9	-3.8	-21.8	-4.0	0.0
1995	2941	1149	196	4	12	57	123	953	626	327	1759	33
1996	2435	869	156	1	12	38	105	713	460	253	1532	34
Difference	-506	-280	-40	-3	0	-19	-18	-240	-166	-74	-227	1
Percent Change	-17.2	-24.4	-20.4	-75.0	0.0	-33.3	-14.6	-25.2	-26.5	-22.6	-12.9	3.0
1996	2435	869	156	1	12	38	105	713	460	253	1532	34
1997	2172	890	183	5	15	48	115	707	503	204	1257	25
Difference	-263	21	27	4	3	10	10	-6	43	-49	-275	-9
Percent Change	-10.8	2.4	17.3	400.0	25.0	26.3	9.5	-0.8	9.3	-19.4	-18.0	-26.5

	FBI Crime Index Total*	CA Crime Index Total	Total	Willful Homicide	Forcible Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	Burglary	Motor Vehicle Theft	Larceny Theft	Arson
1997	2172	890	183	5	15	48	115	707	503	204	1257	25
1998	1804	733	160	2	13	32	113	573	417	156	1055	16
Difference	-368	-157	-23	-3	-2	-16	-2	-134	-86	-48	-202	-9
Percent Change	-16.9	-17.6	-12.6	-60.0	-13.3	-33.3	-1.7	-19.0	-17.1	-23.5	-16.1	-36.0
1998	1804	733	160	2	13	32	113	573	417	156	1055	16
1999	1699	660	116	0	11	24	81	544	383	161	987	52
Difference	-105	-73	-44	-2	-2	-8	-32	-29	-34	5	-68	36
Percent Change	-5.8	-10.0	-27.5	-100.0	-15.4	-25.0	-28.3	-5.1	-8.2	3.2	-6.4	225.0
1999	1699	660	116	0	11	24	81	544	383	161	987	52
2000	1704	647	134	1	13	45	75	513	389	124	1036	21
Difference	6	-13	18	1	2	21	-6	-31	6	-37	49	-30
Percent Change	0.3	-2.0	15.5	0.0	18.2	87.5	-7.4	-5.7	1.6	-23.0	5.0	-59.6
2000	1704	647	134	1	13	45	75	513	389	124	1036	21
2001	1753	700	147	6	11	37	93	553	361	192	1040	13
Difference	49	53	13	5	-2	-8	18	40	-28	68	4	-8
Percent Change	2.9	8.2	9.7	500.0	-15.4	-17.8	24.0	7.8	-7.2	54.8	0.4	-38.1
2001	1753	700	147	6	11	37	93	553	361	192	1040	13
2002	1776	656	138	0	7	26	105	518	355	163	1100	20
Difference	23	-44	-9	-6	-4	-11	12	-35	-6	-29	60	7
Percent Change	1.3	-6.3	-6.1	-100.0	-36.4	-29.7	12.9	-6.3	-1.7	-15.1	5.8	53.8
2002	1776	656	138	0	7	26	105	518	355	163	1100	20
2003	2068	836	165	2	16	45	102	671	466	205	1211	22
Difference	292	180	27	2	9	19	-3	153	111	42	111	2
Percent Change	16.4	27.4	19.6	#DIV/0!	128.6	73.1	-2.9	29.5	31.3	25.8	10.1	10.0
2003	2068	836	165	2	16	45	102	671	466	205	1211	22
2004	2400	893	181	3	15	35	128	712	512	200	1477	30
Difference	332	57	16	1	-1	-10	26	41	46	-5	266	8
Percent Change	16.1	6.8	9.7	50.0	-6.3	-22.2	25.5	6.1	9.9	-2.4	22.0	36.4
2004	2400	893	181	3	15	35	128	712	512	200	1477	30
2005	2509	972	172	0	17	47	108	800	583	217	1515	22
Difference	109	79	-9	-3	2	12	-20	88	71	17	38	-8
Percent Change	4.5	8.8	-5.0	-100.0	13.3	34.3	-15.6	12.4	13.9	8.5	2.6	-26.7

	FBI Crime Index Total*	CA Crime Index Total	Total	Willful Homicide	Forcible Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	Burglary	Motor Vehicle Theft	Larceny Theft	Arson
2005	2509	972	172	0	17	47	108	800	583	217	1515	22
2006	2281	784	199	3	21	58	117	585	425	160	1475	22
Difference	-228	-188	27	3	4	11	9	-215	-158	-57	-40	0
Percent Change	-9.1	-19.3	15.7	0.0	23.5	23.4	8.3	-26.9	-27.1	-26.3	-2.6	0.0
2006	2281	784	199	3	21	58	117	585	425	160	1475	22
2007	2573	835	181	3	20	63	96	654	432	222	1729	9
Difference	292	51	-18	-1	-1	5	-21	69	7	62	254	-13
Percent Change	12.8	6.5	-9.0	-33.3	-4.8	8.6	-17.9	11.8	1.6	38.8	17.2	-59.1
2007	2573	835	181	2	20	63	96	654	432	222	1729	9
2008	2191	731	183	4	13	59	107	548	403	145	1437	23
Difference	-382	-104	2	2	-7	-4	11	-106	-29	-77	-292	14
Percent Change	-14.8	-12.5	1.1	100.0	-35.0	-6.3	11.5	-16.2	-6.7	-34.7	-16.9	155.6
2008	2191	731	183	4	13	59	107	548	403	145	1437	23
2009	2168	644	155	2	10	51	92	489	375	114	1508	16
Difference	-23	-87	-28	-2	-3	-8	-15	-59	-28	-31	71	-7
Percent Change	-1	-12	-15	-50	-23	-14	-14	-11	-7	-21	5	-30
2009	2168	644	155	2	10	51	92	489	375	114	1508	16
2010	2344	651	129	1	14	37	77	522	388	134	1687	6
Difference	176	7	-26	-1	4	-14	-15	33	13	20	179	-10
Percent Change	8	1.1	-17	-50	40	-27	-16	6.7	3.5	13.9	11.9	-63
2010	2344	651	129	1	14	37	77	522	388	134	1687	6
2011	1829	536	116	0	9	41	66	420	315	105	1278	15
Difference	-515	-115	-13	-1	-5	4	-11	-102	-73	-29	-409	9
Percent Change	-22.0	-17.7	-10.1	-100.0	-35.7	10.8	-14.3	-19.5	-18.8	-21.6	-24.2	150.0

*The FBI Crime Index Totals includes the California Crime Index offenses plus larceny-theft and arson.