**The Fast and the Furious: Notions of unfairness and injustice in criticisms of speed enforcement technologies**

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**ABSTRACT**

In the UK, and elsewhere, the use of speed cameras to enforce speed limits has met with significant levels of opposition. Estimates vary as to the extent of the objections to their use, but it is undeniable that the policy has been controversial and that the authorities have had to devote considerable amounts of effort to justifying this road safety intervention. Although commonly acknowledged, these objections have remained unexplored. Opinion polls demonstrate levels of support and opposition without attempting to understand and dissect the specific objections of those who oppose the use of cameras. Focus groups of drivers and Internet discussion forums have been used to look beyond the simple ‘for’ and ‘against’ dichotomy and have identified that notions of justice and fairness lie at the heart of many concerns with the use of speed cameras. This paper will consider how the technology of the speed camera itself contributes to perceptions that the system of enforcement is unfair in a variety of different ways, and will offer some suggestions as to how the policy could be developed to address some of these concerns, and consequently be rendered more generally acceptable to the general public who experience it.

**INTRODUCTION**

This paper represents part of ongoing doctoral research into the social and political contexts of the enforcement of speed limits, or, more specifically, what can be termed ‘the debate’ which has developed recently around the rights and wrongs of the use of speed cameras. The empirical evidence discussed here is drawn from focus groups and interviews conducted with a variety of drivers with different ‘driving biographies’, including recently qualified drivers, convicted speeders, professional drivers, and experienced drivers. It is also supplemented by the use of around 1,000 comments posted on Internet discussion forums hosted by the BBC and various local authorities, which invited comments and observations on various speed and speed-enforcement related topics. While it relates to research conducted within the UK, the observations and recommendations may be of use to any jurisdiction which enforces its speed limits in a similar way.

The use of words such as ‘unfair’ and ‘unjust’ has emerged as common feature of the objections to speed enforcement heard as part of this debate. A selection drawn from the media and from my own participants is included below:

“For a person to lose his driving licence and possibly his job, because he has been caught on a camera four times in three years is, to say the least, unfair.” (Daily Telegraph motoring correspondent, 7th September, 2002)
“It is a travesty of justice that a careful and experienced motorist should be barred from driving because he did 34mph [55kph] in the Limehouse Link [East London tunnel].” (The Independent motoring correspondent, 1st February, 2005)

“In my opinion and experience, whenever confronted with unfairness, lies and biggoted bias as we are now, by this crazy anti-car culture developed mostly by people who were elected by no-one, the solution lies in attacking it at every opportunity.” (male driver, UK, BBC Internet discussion forum)

“What they’ve done to me, banning me, I mean they’ve just carried on with a bit of justice from 20 or 30 years ago. It seems to me to be totally unfair. 12 points always used to be the limit when it was almost impossible to get stopped that many times by a policeman, but now you can do it in one journey!” (banned male driver, late 50s, convicted speeder focus group)

Additionally, we can detect general feelings of underhandedness, of sneakiness and unfairness in the coining of the terms ‘speed trap’ and ‘scamera’, while a YouGov poll conducted in 2003 found that 84% of motorists questioned felt the government treated motorists “unfairly” (YouGov,2003). But what constitutes ‘unfairness’ and what elements make up this sense of ‘injustice’?

In exploring the use of this concept I will utilise a framework which develops and investigates a notion of ‘procedural justice’. This concept, as described by Tyler, provides a definition of these notions which I have found helpful in my research. In order to be ‘procedurally just’ a policy needs to ensure two things: Firstly that the authority which has formulated the policy is trusted, and that there is a belief that it is not behaving in a “biased” or “self-interested” manner (Tyler, 1990:117). Secondly, the enactment or operationalisation of the policy needs to be perceived as fair, with ‘fairness’ in this context equating to consistency (Tyler, 1990:138), “neutrality, lack of bias, honesty [and] efforts to be fair” (ibid:7) as well as incorporating “impartiality, good faith, and the consideration of one’s views.”(ibid:117).

This paper will make suggestions for amending the policy in the light of these concerns and evaluate current developments from the same perspective. But firstly, it will consider whether these are sufficiently widespread concerns to make them worthy of consideration.

HOW MANY PEOPLE DO OBJECT?

Opinion polls are a common feature of the battle for public opinion in the speed camera debate. Those promoted by Safety Camera Partnerships and the government have evidenced an average of 75% support for the use of cameras (Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety,2003:4). However, with questions like ‘the use of cameras should be supported as a method of reducing casualties’ (agree/disagree) (Department for Transport,2003:5-4) and ‘cameras are a useful road safety tool’ (agree/disagree), there is ample room for differing interpretations. Several people with whom I discussed these polls as part of my research volunteered the answer ‘agree’ to these questions, feeling that cameras should be used for road safety purposes - but were not always used for this reason, and that they were an important road safety tool - but not the only road safety tool

1 In response to a question which asked about the government’s treatment of motorists, 84% of respondents selected the option “unfairly” from a list which also included "too generously", "about right" and "don’t know".
that should be used. Other suspected reasons for their use included the predictable ‘revenue raising’ and ‘war on the motorist’ allegations, which were then free to coexist with what the authorities took to be unconditional support for their policies. As such these polls (as one of my Home Office interviewees admitted) are perhaps not the best way to start. Instead we can detect a significant level of opposition in the media, and in the surveys produced by those organisations that oppose their use – some evidencing as much as 80-90% opposition to the scheme. This suggests that polls may be an overly simplistic method of assessing levels of public support.

Of course, in addition to this evidence, we have a small number of extremely active and aggressive opponents who are prepared to go outside the law to firebomb, chainsaw and otherwise vandalise cameras. As a final indicator it should be mentioned that a significant level of at least partial opposition and only reserved, conditional support was revealed by this research. One focus group participant asking if I had “ever actually met someone who was in favour of these things [cameras]?!”

A basic analysis of my Internet sourced contributions also demonstrated about a 60-40% split, with the majority showing a significant degree of dissatisfaction with, or opposition to, speed cameras.

I am satisfied that I have detected a sufficient level of opposition to make an analysis of the substance of these objections a worthwhile undertaking, and, as one of my interviewees from the Department of Transport noted, they had never before had to spend so much time and energy justifying a road safety intervention: these were normally “pretty uncontroversial vote-winners”.

WHY SHOULD WE CARE IF PEOPLE OBJECT?

Clearly, some people aren’t happy about the use of speed cameras, but why should we care? Significantly for my purposes, Tyler’s research also sets out the consequences of operating policies which are seen as procedurally unjust or unfair. He suggests that perceived unfairness in the systems of policy-making and enforcement can lead to a de-legitimising effect on the policy itself, but also on the wider legitimacy of the system (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003:514). In ‘partnership’ arrangements as used in the UK, this potentially de-legitimising effect should therefore be a concern to all implicated agencies. This de-legitimising effect can manifest in a lack of co-operation with those agencies, a lack of compliance with their demands and a general mistrust of their motives and behaviour (ibid:102 and 514). The following quotes from my research contain evidence of the consequences Tyler predicts:

“I think its about time the police and law enforcement agencies begin to realise that in persecuting and alienating the motorist they are, in fact, creating a barrier between most of the population and the police. After all most of the population are motorists and we are beginning to feel persecuted – or at least I am and I have, all my life supported the police, but at 60 I am now finding an increasing unwillingness to offer that support. (male driver, England, BBC Internet discussion forum)

“I am not a boy racer but a middle aged mother of two who is sick to death of the persecution of the motorist. Any part who backs these cameras in the next election should pay the cost of the loss of votes that will accompany their
decision. Its about time the motorist formed an alliance similar to the Countryside Alliance and displayed their displeasure as a united front. Let's see some unity, let's fight for road safety and the removal of cameras - they are not the answer, let's make sure they get the message!" (female driver, Wales, BBC Wales Internet discussion forum)

For now, it is sufficient to note these potential consequences as justification for the exploration of the content and substance of objections which forms the bulk of this paper. Regardless of the contradictory research findings about the effectiveness or otherwise of cameras which form the core of this debate in the UK, it seems safe to suggest that a policy which threatens to de-legitimise both road safety and crime-fighting policy and the agencies associated with it is a cause for concern. In this paper, therefore, objections to speed enforcement policy will be taken seriously as indicators of a potentially serious trend in public opinion and behaviour. If an exploration of the objections made by opponents of the policy can lead to suggested amendments which lessen these negative feelings while still allowing for the use of speed cameras where appropriate and useful, then benefits will conceivably accrue to all, regardless of their stance on cameras generally. As such, this paper takes the stance of trying to understand these objections with a view to making the policy more acceptable, less controversial and more likely to increase rather than damage support for the authorities involved.

We begin with some common complaints drawn from the debate, many of which I suspect will not just be familiar to a UK audience:

“Why aren’t they out catching burglars?”

“Why pick on law-abiding motorists? What about the real criminals?”

“I was only doing 34 mph [55kph]”

“It’s just a revenue raising/tax generating scheme.”

“The cameras aren’t in the right places. If they were, I wouldn’t mind.”

“What about unlicensed/untaxed/uninsured/dangerous/drunk drivers?”

But from amongst the hackneyed phrases and indignant defences, can we discern some genuine concerns about the way we operate our speed enforcement policies? Four themes have emerged from the research, which in some way mirror those aspects identified by Tyler. In the following, criticisms will be grouped into the themes of unfair locations of cameras, unfair speed limits themselves, unfair aspects of the technology used to detect speeding offences, and unfair methods of prosecuting those detected offences.

1. UNFAIR AND ILLEGITIMATE CAMERA LOCATIONS

I have alluded above to the use of cameras ‘where appropriate and useful’ and it is with this notion that I will begin. Few of my contributors demonstrated an unconditional support of or opposition to cameras. The vast majority volunteered their opinions on the right and proper criteria for placement and usage of cameras, with
few people unprepared to admit that their use was justified and legitimate in some places and at some times. Even my interview with the self-styled ‘Captain Gatso’ of the most violent of the groups who vandalise and destroy cameras (‘Motorists Against Detection’) revealed that his organisation would never target cameras outside schools or in residential areas, only those “on fast, straight A-roads that were protecting no-one.” These provisos were repeated throughout my research with cameras which were seen to be protecting school children, the elderly, vulnerable road users or located at sites with a known and accepted accident history being exempt from the criticisms which were directed at cameras located at sites perceived to be ‘safe’ for all involved.

This provisional support and opposition relates to the core of the debate itself. Cameras are accepted where their placement seems to reflect the stated road safety aim of the policy. They are viewed as unacceptable where that aim is less clear, where their siting does not make sense to drivers given their knowledge of the location or time in which they operate. In a residential area or outside a school, the risk posed by incremental increases in speed cannot be denied. However, where pedestrians are seemingly absent, drivers are free to re-interpret the motivations behind the policy and to perceive these motivations as being the illegitimate alternatives of ‘revenue raising’ or ‘the war on the motorist’ - perceived “self-interest” on behalf of the authorities (Tyler, 1990:117)

In a debate flooded with contradictory research on the effectiveness of cameras, and a suspicious public mindful of these illegitimate motives, convincing drivers that cameras are located for safety reasons is an important (though potentially difficult) task for the enforcing authorities. Suggestions developed from the contributions of the participants in this research include that the authorities should de-emphasise large-scale, generalised research findings and instead redirect their energy toward justifying and giving reasons for cameras on an individual basis. The following exchange from a focus group of professional drivers demonstrates the perceived pay-off from adopting this approach:

Jim “What they should do is promote how many deaths or accidents or whatever happened in that area, and then people might see the point, because they’re always getting bad press reports aren’t they? I mean I’ve read a press report that says speed cameras haven’t reduced a single road death in Britain. Now whether that’s true or not I don’t actually know, but its what I’ve seen in the paper

Tom But I don’t think anyone can tell that can they?

Jim No but its in the papers, I’ve read it.

Terry The one I was on about has definitely helped, it’s definitely helped. I know it was worse before.

Jim That’s what I’m saying. You’d see it in a different light so if they promoted that to people, people would understand, see it in a different light wouldn’t they?”

(focus group of professional drivers)

This approach would differ significantly from the approach currently being attempted by the authorities through the publication of research findings relating to the whole country and to aggregate gains in road safety. Although potentially more dramatic in terms of being able to demonstrate high numbers of lives saved, they allow drivers to continue to mistrust the reasoning behind the placement of individual cameras which they may pass on a daily basis. This aggregate-findings approach, combined with the publicising of the locations of both mobile and fixed speed cameras, seemingly confuses the sense of ‘fairness’ under discussion here with that of ‘openness’. No
amount of publicity about a camera which is perceived to be located where it is not needed is going to convince the public that its installation and operation is legitimate. It will only draw attention a camera which is considered unnecessary and which consequently undermines the policy. By publicising the individual reasons for the location of that individual camera, its purpose could be stated and expressly and demonstrably linked to the national scheme and its stated (and legitimate) purpose.

2. UNFAIR AND ILLEGAL LIMITS

In many ways, the notion of inappropriate speed limits relates to the issue of locations above. Cameras which enforce limits which are perceived to be out of date, inappropriate or only appropriate at some times, are as potentially damaging as cameras which are seen to be at locations where they are not needed. Their use cannot be seen as evidence of “good faith” (Tyler, 1990:117) on behalf of the authorities as they punish behaviour which is not felt to be unsafe in particular contexts. Suggestions made by my participants included that limits should be reviewed for their appropriateness before cameras were considered, and also that variable limits could go some way towards reflecting the experiences of drivers who knew that the amount of danger posed by their driving varied throughout the day. Examples included the beginning and end of the school day, different weather conditions and reduced speeds through roadworks at times when there was no longer a workforce in need of protection. It was considered unfair that this resulted in the curtailing of behaviour when it was considered to pose no discernible risk.

The example of weather conditions also links to the common objection that speed limits were occasionally an inappropriate guide to safe speeds, with many drivers concerned that the approach encouraged was to view them as safe speeds when in fact a lower speed was often necessary. The recent Department for Transport (DfT) ‘Think!’ advertisement which features a girl hit by a car travelling at two different speeds was singled out for particular criticism. In this advertisement, a girl is hit first at 40 miles per hour [64kph] and is killed, then at 30 mph [48kph] and her injuries are lessened. The press release for this campaign notes that in the lower speed crash scenario ‘[w]hat you actually see are the bones going back into place (the arm), the wound on the head heals itself, and the scrapes recede.”(DfT,2005)

My participants questioned both the desirability of promoting a speed which ‘only seriously injured her’, and the implication that speeds of 30 mph were unquestionably ‘safe’ in areas such as the one shown. Many also commented that the advert implies that speeds of 30 mph ‘actually heal people’ who have been injured!

Generally, the underlying criticism contained within this objection was that current enforcement policy encouraged a ‘drive by numbers’ approach which threatened to de-skill the driving process. This is discernible in the classic objection that in passing a speed camera, all the driver’s attention is directed at the speedo in an effort to comply with the immediate ‘danger’ of impending prosecution and as such is diverted from the ‘real’ danger which (to refer back to point 1) is being used to justify that camera’s existence in the first place. While it is difficult to suggest ways in which this effect could be mediated given the current policy and its methods of enforcement, it is worth noting that drivers themselves have identified and are critical of this ‘oversimplification’ in the government’s education campaigns. The option of variable limits which reflected ‘actual levels of risk’ were considered to be both a desirable and feasible amendment to the policy.
Several recently-qualified focus group participants also pointed out that limits had been emphasised by their instructors, as a guide to appropriate speed, or as a target to be reached so as not to impede other road users. This interpretation, if commonplace, may be serving to reinforce the sense of the speed limit being a universally safe speed at which to drive.

3. UNFAIR METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT

If the underlying motives of a policy are called into question, then there is seemingly no way in which its enforcement can therefore be seen as fair. However, even if the motives behind a policy are accepted as just, the subsequent methods by which these motives are operationalised can lead to a perception of unfairness in terms of that implementation itself, and to damage to the legitimacy of the enforcing authorities.

The elements of the current policy which I have implied (above) make a more contextualised and flexible approach to speed limits problematic, centre around the use of the speed camera itself as the detection and enforcement technology. Drawing again on the ‘classic’ objections identified at the start of this paper, we can see that claims of being a “good” or “law abiding” driver or of having “driven for 30 years without an accident” can be traced back to the use of the camera to catch an isolated moment, a momentary lapse, which many drivers felt was an unfair reflection of both their skills and their identity as an individual. The two drivers quoted below, both with over twenty years of driving experience, make the following requests:

Laura “I think it should take more into account. Its not just your speed at the particular moment, its how well you’re driving, so its not just about what the speedometer says.” (female, convicted speeder focus group – 9 penalty points)

Martin “I think the idea of a network of cameras that are constantly aware of the speed you are going at is that it’s a much more comprehensive evaluation if you like, of your driving because you’ve had the chance to prove yourself as a driver across a whole road network. In that one place that one moment that you go past you could be the best driver in the world but for that one moment, and you get punished for it. Whereas if you knew the cameras were everywhere I don’t think you could have that sense of it being a one off, snap money making thing.” (male, experienced driver focus group)

In the second example, the suggestion is made that the SPECS system\(^2\) of networked cameras, currently operating at a few locations in the UK, offers the potential for a more legitimately-perceived system. The extension of this system, according to my results, would more effectively give the impression that the authorities were interested in reducing speeds on the whole network, rather than at a few isolated points.

The question “why aren’t they out catching burglars” instead of “honest law-abiding citizens like me” also relates to the implication that the driver is a dangerous criminal, based only on the failure to comply with a posted speed limit on a specific occasion. What can be discerned within these comments is a desire for speed enforcement to acknowledge a previous unblemished record, a lifetime of being an “upstanding citizen” – to allow for a more situated and contextualised version of the driver to be

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\(^2\) The SPECS camera system measures average speeds between pairs of cameras, rather than at a specific point.
acknowledged. Drivers’ suggestions for recognising this history included some sort of credit or incentive scheme which either offered bonus points, or allowed a reduction in road tax to those individuals who could evidence a ‘clean’ licence for a prolonged period, in a similar way to the ‘no claims bonus’ allowance from the insurance world. The desire to be treated as an individual also seemingly underpins the fond(er) memories that now emerge of a time when a police officer would pull a driver over and engage in conversation about the alleged offence. As many drivers admitted, this gave them an opportunity to offer excuses, justifications and mitigating circumstances, as well as to be polite and amenable, and ultimately to sense the potential for “a ticking-off” before being “sent on my way”. This opportunity has been acknowledged as important by the Police Federation who express concern that the lack of discretion caused by the use of cameras was damaging their relations with the public:

“All of these people will now have a grudge against the police. In the past, speeders were stopped by identifiable officers and at least had a relationship with the human side of the police, not a machine.” (Police Federation Spokesperson, quoted Sunday Telegraph, 11\textsuperscript{th} January 2004)

The unprecedented opportunity to enforce without discrimination or favour (Lanos and Douglas,2000:108) is seemingly viewed with suspicion and opposition by those who previously felt they benefited from the discriminatory enforcement of the law by virtue of their good reputation - their essential ‘law-abidingness’ - but who now find themselves judged only on their behaviour, devoid of any context or earned credits. Although we have taken a definition of fairness that upholds “consistency” (Tyler,1990:138) and “impartiality” (Tyler,1990:117) as necessary components of a procedurally just system, it seems in this case that the method of enforcement results in detections which are perceived as unfair by virtue of being too fair. They fail to accord what is perceived as an appropriate degree of leniency and respect to those who feel entitled to, and are accustomed to receiving, some degree of preferential or permissive treatment from the authorities.

While, again, a difficult objection to address given the construction of the current system, research from elsewhere in the criminal law suggests that these concerns should be taken seriously. The police, local government officials and cameras themselves operate as “access points” (Giddens, 1990:82) to the system as a whole, and their treatment of, and interaction with, the public are key determinants of the way in which that system is viewed and influence future co-operation with that system. As such, a first point of contact that hurts the pride of the individual, refuses to acknowledge individual circumstances or the situated context of the offence may result in the de-legitimation of the system as a whole – whether this contact point is a human or, more likely in this context, a machine. The suggestions above relating to varied limits may contribute to providing some degree of context to prosecutions, but a lack of context is also a consequence of the designated legal status of the offence and of the subsequent prosecution procedure, the subject to which I now turn.

4. UNFAIR AND ILLEGITIMATE PROSECUTION PROCEDURES

As a strict liability offence, speeding is inevitably decontextualised to a degree in that considerations like intent, motive or culpability are rendered irrelevant. Combined with the enforcement technology used to detect it, this means that speeding offences
exist irrespective of those elements of context considered so important to the drivers who participated in this research. This dismissal of intent and of what drivers saw as their essential ‘law-abidingness’ was felt to contradict the moralised education campaigns that accompany the scheme. Despite being invited to make a moral choice about their speed, ‘moral’ drivers felt this ‘good intent’ was irrelevant should they inadvertently get caught and that they would then be punished in the same way as someone who had intentionally dismissed the moral appeal and sped to a truly excessive degree. Again, we can turn to our list of classic complaints, where we find protests such as “I thought it was a 40 limit”, “another car was intimidating me” and “I was going down hill” as well as the particularly creative “I had new shoes which were heavier than my old ones and exerted greater pressure on the accelerator”. These demonstrate that drivers consider these to be mitigating circumstances which should lessen their culpability and thus their punishment. They are reasons constructed by law-abiding drivers to explain their apparent offending and to explain-away why they have been caught doing something for which they can be punished.

Several developments within UK policy can be seen as relevant here. The introduction of Speed Awareness Courses where drivers are taught the reasons for speed limits are both emerging as popular with drivers as alternatives to prosecution, and valuable opportunities for a more qualitative interaction between ‘the system’ and the individual driver. From the perspective of this research, they provide an opportunity for the driver to discuss (and often to have challenged) their excuses for their behaviour, with the intention that these excuses should then cease to justify further offending. However, from a procedural justice perspective, these courses provide the driver with an opportunity to voice their concerns, to interact with a human being who represents the system, rather than with an un-communicative robot. Tyler suggests that, even if this individual is incapable of altering the driver’s punishment, or the outcome of the case in any way, the opportunity to ‘voice’ to an official audience is valued in and of itself and can improve the driver’s sense of having “process control”, increasing the legitimacy with which it is viewed (Lind and Tyler,1988:106). In a similar way, the inclusion of a section inviting ‘comments’ on the Notice of Intended Prosecution issued following an offence was considered important, in this example forming a wider discussion between a group of convicted speeders about the importance of having the opportunity to have your say:

Trevor “I was stopped by a policeman years ago in my MG. At least you are able to have, like, an interaction with them, plead mitigating circumstances.”

Lucy “Exchange points of view!”

Trevor “Yeah, and if he still wants to go ahead and book you, fair enough, but at least you have the opportunity to say ‘listen, the circumstances were this, this, and this’, whereas with cameras there’s no chance.”

Lucy “And you know when you used to get sent the form there was a section that asked for any reasons you were speeding, and I always had that, but the last one or two that I had didn’t have that. There was nothing to say ‘why?’, so they’d obviously - well you never thought for a moment that they’d take any notice - but at least it was there so you could say.”

Sue “You feel as though you are doing something if you write in. It said on my form ‘no appeal!’” (focus group of convicted speeders)

A further development, and one which seemingly acknowledges the importance of a flexible approach to speeding offences, is the proposals recently consulted upon by
the Home Office and Department for Transport for the introduction of graduated penalties for different excessive speeds. The system would apparently allow the allocation of a "different level of points for different circumstances" because "the level of the penalty needs to fit the crime, and be regarded as doing so, for maintaining public confidence in and respect for the legal process" (DfT, 2004, emphasis in original). This is a development which may be seen as allowing for the differential treatment of intentional and accidental, ‘dangerous’ v ‘safe’ offenders. This may be interpreted by those ‘law-abiding offenders’ mentioned above as a recognition that they should be treated with more leniency than the supposedly criminally-minded drivers who speed intentionally and by wide margins. Whether or not this is the case, the proposals allow for a more situated approach to penalties to be taken which is likely to increased the sense of proportionality and fairness amongst drivers, something which has clearly come to concern the authorities, as this quote from a senior Department for Transport official demonstrates

"I think its a confusing message, but if the message is such that drivers feel they are being more fairly treated, and they're willing to accept that there is a proportionality here, and that cameras aren't black and white – I mean black and white in the judgement sense – and if they're only a few miles over they get a lower ticket than if they're doing thirty [mph] over. Fine. If that’s what people really believe is the way to go. But we shall see.” (Senior Department for Transport official)

In addition to the actual proposals contained within this consultation, the developments also demonstrate that the authorities are willing to listen to criticisms and respond by changing the system – something which should increase the sense of process control felt by drivers and impact positively on their sense of the legitimacy of the system.

CONCLUSIONS

By reconsidering some of the oft-heard objections to speed enforcement through the lens of this theoretical framework, it becomes clear that there are elements of every stage of the policy, from policy development to its enactment, which invite (in some cases justified) criticism from drivers. By taking these criticisms seriously and viewing them as indicators of genuine concerns about the policy we can hope to minimise the de-legitimising effects that the policy may have. Given that the majority of drivers see some merit in camera enforcement (subject to important caveats about location, time etc.) it seems that any changes to the policy could realistically increase satisfaction levels among the motoring public. In turn we can then expect to reduce the risk of non-compliance and non-co-operation with both speed limits and with the wider policies of the enforcing agencies, rendering both more effective and producing the anticipated road safety and wider societal benefits. This research shows that the perceived ‘fairness’ of the design and enactment of a policy is a key determinant of its subsequently perceived legitimacy. Consequently, a ‘fairness’ framework is a logical place from which to start when considering the future direction of the policy. Further, my research shows that the legitimacy of the system has a knock-on effect for the way in which the authorities which implement these policies are perceived. As such, there is good reason for all the partner agencies with a role in enforcing speed limits with speed cameras to take the protestations of their ‘customers’ seriously.
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